Considering a multi-user interference network with an eavesdropper, this paper aims at the power allocation to optimize the worst secrecy throughput among the network links or the secure energy efficiency in terms of achieved secrecy throughput per Joule under link security requirements. Three scenarios for the access of channel state information are considered: the perfect channel state information, partial channel state information with channels from the transmitters to the eavesdropper exponentially distributed, and not perfectly known channels between the transmitters and the users with exponentially distributed errors. The paper develops various path-following procedures of low complexity and rapid convergence for the optimal power allocation. Their effectiveness and viability are illustrated through numerical examples. The power allocation schemes are shown to achieve both high secrecy throughput and energy efficiency. The same resource allocation problem for SEE maximization assuming full-duplex relaying is considered in [17] . Recently, the authors in [18] and [19] also derived the trade-off between SEE and secure spectral efficiency in cognitive radio networks. All these works have assumed the perfect CSI knowledge at the transmitter end, which is not always possible.
In this paper, we propose novel and efficient resource allocation algorithms for both worstcase secure throughput and worst secure energy efficiency maximization of a highly interferencelimited multi-user wireless network. Unlike many previous works, we do not assume perfect CSI knowledge at the transmitters. In fact, our transmitters only carry channel distribution knowledge for the eavesdropper and imperfect CSI for the users. Particularly, we consider three optimization scenarios to gradually build our algorithms. We start with the "perfect CSI" scenario. Next, we consider a "partial CSI" setup where the channel between the transmitters and the eavesdropper is exponentially distributed and only that channel distribution knowledge is available at the transmitters. Finally, we solve for the hardest "robust optimization" scenario, where in addition to the assumption of only channel distribution knowledge about eavesdroppers, we also assume uncertain channels between the transmitters and the users with exponentially distributed errors.
We develop various path-following procedures of low complexity and rapid convergence for the optimal power allocation. Our extensive simulation results illustrate their effectiveness and viability.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II, section III and section IV are devoted to optimizing the links' worst secrecy throughput and the network secure energy efficiency under the perfect CSI, partial CSI and imperfectly known CSI, respectively. The simulation is provided in Section V to show the efficiency of the theoretical developments in the previous section. Appendices provide fundamental rate outage inequalities and approximations, which are the mathematical base of the theoretical sections II-IV.
II. INTERFERENCE NETWORKS UNDER PERFECT CSI
We consider a cooperative network consisting of M single-antenna transmitters and M singleantenna users as depicted in Figure 1 , where each transmitter i intends to send the information s i to user i. The information s i is normalized, i.e. E(x 2 i ) = 1. Let p i be the transmit power allocated to transmitter i and p = (p 1 , . . . , p M )
T . Furthermore, denote by h ji the channel gain from transmitter j to user i. The received signal at user i is
where n i ∈ CN (0, σ 2 i ) is additive noise. Suppose that there is an eavesdropper (EV), which is also equipped with a single antenna.
Denoting by h ie the channel gain from transmitter i to the EV, the received signal at the EV is
h ie p i s i + n e ,
where n e ∈ CN (0, σ 2 e ) is additive noise. Under the perfect CSI at the transmitters, the information throughput at user i is
With the EV considered as part of the legitimate network, the channel gain h ie can also be assumed known [22] . The wiretapped throughput for user i at the EV is
The secrecy throughput in transmitting information s i to user i while keeping it confidential from the eavesdropper is defined as
We consider the following fundamental optimization problems in a such network: the maximin secrecy throughput optimization
Initialized by a feasible p (0) for the convex constraint (4b), at the κ-th iteration we solve the convex optimization problem
to generate the next iterative point p (κ+1) .
One can see that
because the former is the optimal solution of (11) while the latter is its feasible point. Therefore,
i.e. p (κ+1) is better than p (κ) ; as such {p (κ) } is a sequence of improved points that converges at least to a locally optimal solution of (4) satisfying the first order necessary optimality condition [27, Prop. 1] . In summary, we propose in Algorithm 1 a path-following computational procedure for the maximin secrecy throughput optimization problem (4).
Algorithm 1 Path-following algorithm for maximin secrecy throughput optimization Initialization: Set κ = 0. Choose an initial feasible point p (0) for the convex constraints (4b).
Calculate R
min as the value of the objective in (4) at p (0) .
repeat
• Set κ = κ + 1.
• Solve the convex optimization problem (11) to obtain the solution p (κ) .
• Calculate R
min as the value of the objective in (4) at p (κ) .
B. Secure energy efficient maximization
Applying the inequality (75) in Appendix II for
for
On the other hand, applying inequality (77) in Appendix II for α = 1+ln(2),
which together with (78) in Appendix II yield
for the concave function
Initialized by a feasible point p (0) for (5), we solve the following convex optimization problem at the κ-th iteration to generate the next iterative point p (κ+1) :
Due to (7) and (9), the nonconvex constraint (5b) in (5) is implied by the convex constraint (18b) in (18) . Similarly to (12) , we can show that
as such the computational procedure that invokes the convex program (18) to generate the next iterative point, is path-following for (5), which at least converges to its locally optimal solution satisfying the Karush-Kuh-Tucker (KKT) conditions of optimality.
Recalling the definition (9) and (10) i , initialized by any feasible point p 0) for the convex constraint (4b), we generatep (κ+1) , κ = 0, . . . , as the optimal solution of the convex optimization problem
is feasible for (5) that is needed for the initial step.
Analogously, to address the maximin secure energy efficient optimization problem (27) define
Similarly to (13) and (16) the following inequalities can be obtained:
Initialized a feasible point p (0) for (27) , which is found by using the generation (19) , the following convex optimization problem at the κ-th iteration is proposed to generate the next iterative point
The computational procedure that invokes the convex program (24) to generate the next iterative point, is path-following for (27) , which at least converges to its locally optimal solution satisfying the first order necessary optimality condition.
III. INTERFERENCE NETWORKS UNDER PARTIAL WIRETAP CSI
When the EV is not part of the legitimate network, it is almost impossible to estimate channels h ie from the transmitters to it. It is common to assume that h ie ∼h ie χ ie , where χ ie is an exponential distribution with the unit mean andh ie is a known deterministic quantity.
Accordingly, instead of (2), the wiretapped throughput for user i at the EV is defined via the following throughput outage [28] - [32] :
for ǫ EV > 0. Using (65) in Appendix I, it follows that
where
Therefore, the problem of maximin secrecy throughput optimization can be formulated as
The following result unravels the computationally intractable nonlinear equality constraints in (26) .
Proposition 1:
The problem (27) is equivalent to the following problem
Proof: Since the equality constraint (26) implies the inequality constraint (28b), it is true that max (27) ≤ max (28) .
We now show that there is an optimal solution of (28) satisfies the equality constraint (26) and
showing the equivalence between (28) and (27) . Indeed, suppose that at the optimality,
that yields
so γ i r i is also the optimal solution of (28), which satisfies the equality constraint (26) .
To address problem (28) , note that a lower bounding function for the first term in (28a) is
i (p p p) defined by (8) , while an upper bounding function for the second term in (28a) is the following linear function
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The main difficulty now is to develop a lower bounding approximation for the function in the left hand side (LHS) of constraint (28b). Applying inequality (74) in Appendix II for x = 1/r ihje p j ,
and y (κ) ij
. Therefore, over the trust region
it is true that
Note that in obtaining (33) we also used the fact that function ν(r i , p j ) 1/r 2 i p 2 j is convex in the domain {r i > 0, p j > 0} and accordingly [24] 
Initialized from a feasible point (p (0) , r (0) ) for (28) we solve the following convex program at the κ-th iteration to generate (p (κ+1) , r
is found from solving
A bisection on [r l , r u ] for solving ψ i (r i ) = 0 where ψ i increases in r i > 0 is implemented as follows:
In summary, we propose in Algorithm 2 a path-following computational procedure for the maximin secrecy throughput optimization problem (28) , which at least converges to its locally optimal solution satisfying the first order necessary optimality condition.
Algorithm 2 Path-following algorithm for maximin secrecy throughput optimization Initialization: Set κ = 0. Choose an initial feasible point (p (0) , r (0) ) for (28) and calculate
min as the value of the objective function in (28) 
• Solve the convex optimization problem (34) to obtain the solution (p (κ) , r (κ) u ).
• Solve the nonlinear equations (35) to obtain the roots r
) is found as follows: taking p (0) feasible to the power constraint (4b) and finding r (0) from solving
u,i can be easily found: from any r u,i > 0, if ψ i (r u,i ) ≥ 0 then we are done. Otherwise reset r u,i ← 2r u,i and check ψ i (r u,i ). Stop when
Furthermore, the problem of SEE maximization can be formulated as
Using the inequality (76) in Appendix II leads to
Initialized by a feasible (p (0) , r (0) ), the following convex programm is solved to generate (p (κ+1) , r (κ+1) ) at the κiteration:
It can be shown that the computational procedure that invokes the convex program (39) to generate the next iterative point, is path-following for (37), which at least converges to its locally optimal solution satisfying the KKT conditions. Similarly, a path-following procedure for the following maximin SEE optimization problem can be proposed
IV. ROBUST OPTIMIZATION Beside assuming that h ie ∼h ie χ ie with an exponential distribution χ ie with the unit mean and deterministic h ie , we also assume that CSI of h ji is not known perfectly in the form h ji = h ji (1 + δχ ji ) with deterministich ji and δ, and random χ ji , which is an independent exponential distribution of the unit mean, and h ie ∼h ie χ ie with exponential distributions χ ji and χ ie of the unit mean. Instead of (1), the throughput at user i is defined via the following outage probability
for 0 < ǫ c << 1.
Using (69) in Appendix II, it follows that
Therefore, the problem of maximin secrecy throughput robust optimization is defined by
The following result unravels the computationally intractable nonlinear equality constraints in
Proposition 2: Problem (44) is equivalent to the following problem
Proof: Again, it is obvious that max (44) ≤ (45).
Furthermore, at an optimal solution of (45), if
for some i then there is γ > 1 such that
which results in ln(1 + γR i ) > ln(1 + R i ), implying that γR i is also an optimal solution of (45). We thus have proved that there is always an optimal solution of (45) to satisfy the equality constraints in (43), so
completing the proof of Proposition 2.
To address problem (45), firstly we provide a lower bounding approximation for the first term in the objective function in (45a) as follows
Next, to obtain an upper bounding approximation for the function in the left hand side of (45b) and thus to provide an inner approximation for constraint (45b), we use the following inequality
over the trust region
Then
Initialized from a feasible (p (0) , R (0) , r (0) ) for (45) we solve the following convex program at the κ-th iteration to generate the next iterative point (p (κ+1) , R
At the same κ-th iteration, r 
for the increasing function
R u,i can be easily located: initialized by R i = 2R
and check
In summary, we propose in Algorithm 3 a path-following computational procedure for the maximin secrecy throughput optimization problem (45), which at least converges to its locally optimal solution satisfying the first order necessary optimality condition.
An initial feasible (p (0) , R (0) , r (0) ) can be easily found as follows: taking any p (0) feasible to the power constraint (4b) to find R (0) and r (0) from solving
j )], and r (0) is found from solving 
repeat
• Solve the convex optimization problem (50) to obtain the solution (
• Solve the nonlinear equations (35) to obtain the roots r (κ) i .
• Solve the nonlinear equations (51) to obtain the roots R (κ) i .
• Calculate R (κ) min as the value of the objective function in (45) 
Lastly, the network secure energy efficiency problem is now formulated by
To this end, we use inequality (75) in Appendix II to obtain
Initialized by a feasible point (R (0) , r (0) , p (0) ), at the κ-th iteration, the following convex programm is solved to generated (
It can be shown that the computational procedure that invokes the convex program (55) to generate the next iterative point, is path-following for (53), which at least converges to its locally optimal solution satisfying the KKT conditions. The terms "Perfect CSI", "Partial CSI" and "Robust Opt." correspond to the scenarios discussed in Sections III, IV and V, respectively. Fig. 2 plots the minimum secrecy throughput versus the transmit power budget P i varying from 10 to 50 mW. As expected, it is seen that the secrecy throughput increase with the transmitted power budget P i . It is also observed that the secrecy throughput of "Partial CSI" with ǫ EV = 0.1 is always better than the secrecy throughputs of others. For ǫ EV = 0.1, "Partial CSI" and "Robust Opt." clearly and significantly outperform "Perfect CSI". However, the secrecy throughput of "Perfect CSI" is superior to the secrecy throughputs of "Partial CSI" and "Robust Opt." with ǫ EV = 0.6. This is not a surprise because according to the wiretapped throughput defined by (2) and the throughput outage defined by (25) - (26), the former is seen higher than the later for small ǫ EV . Table I provides the average number of iterations required to solve maximin secrecy throughput optimization for the above three cases. As can be observed, our proposed algorithm converges in less than 14 iterations, on average, for all considered cases. 
B. Energy efficiency maximization
In this subsection, we first examine the performance of EE maximization algorithm versus the QoS constraint. The transmitted power P i is fixed at 20 mW and QoS constraint c i varies from 0.1 to 0.5 bps/Hz. It can be observed from Fig. 3 that the EE performance degrades as the QoS constraint c i increases. Moreover, "Partial CSI" with ǫ EV = 0.1 outperforms others in terms of EE performance. To find out the impact on the sum throughput and total power consumption in EE maximization algorithm, the achieved sum throughput and the total power consumed are illustrated in Fig. 4 and 5, respectively. It can be seen that the total power consumption increases faster than the sum throughput, which explains why EE degrades as c i increases in Fig. 3 . Although the sum throughput of "Robust Opt." is slightly better than "Partial CSI", "Partial CSI" consumes less power than "Robust Opt.". Table II shows that our proposed EE maximization algorithm converges in less than 35 iterations, on average, in all considered cases. 
C. Maxmin energy efficiency optimization
In this subsection, we aim to maximize the minimum EE performance. Firstly, Fig. 9 plots the maximized minimum EE versus QoS constraint. The transmitted power P i is fixed at 20 mW and QoS constraint c i varies from 0.1 to 0.5 bps/Hz. It can be seen that the optimized minimum EE decreases with increasing c i and the EE performance of "Partial CSI" with ǫ EV = 0.1 is always better than the optimized EE of other cases. Furthermore, it is also observed that for ǫ EV = 0.1 "Partial CSI" and "Robust Opt." outperform "Perfect CSI" in terms of EE performance, while Fig. 10 and 11 , respectively. Table III shows that maximin EE optimization converges in less than 33 iterations, on average, in all considered cases.
Next, we investigate the maximin EE performance versus the transmit power budget. The QoS constraint c i is fixed at 0.4 bps/Hz and P i varies from 10 to 50 mW. The minimum EE performance versus the transmit power budget is illustrated in Fig. 12 . Again, we observe that the optimized minimum EE saturates when the transmit power is larger than some threshold. This is due to the fact that under small transmit power regime, the EE is maximized by maximizing the throughput in the numerator. When the transmit power is large enough to obtain the optimized EE, both throughput and power consumption accordingly saturate in Figs. 13 and 14. 
Proof: Writing f (x, y, t) = (1/t)(ln(xy + 1) − ln x − ln y), it is ease to see that the Hessian 
where the inequality (72) has been applied to the (3, 3)-th entry of ∇ 2 f (x, y, t) to arrive the matrix inequality in (73). Here and after, A B for matrices A and B means that A − B is a positive definite matrix. Then, calculating the subdeterminants of matrix in the right hand side (RHS) of (73) Therefore the matrix in the RHS of (73) is positive definite, implying that the Hessian ∇ 2 f (x, y, t)
is positive definite, which is the necessary and sufficient condition for the convexity of f [24] .
As the function f (x, y) ln(1 + 1/xy) is convex in the domain {x > 0, y > 0} it follows that [24] for every x > 0, y > 0,x > 0 andȳ > 0, ln(1 + 1/xy) = f (x, y) ≥ f (x,ȳ) + ∇f (x,ȳ), (x, y) − (x,ȳ) = ln(1 + 1/xȳ) + 1/xȳ 1 + 1/xȳ (2 − x/x − y/ȳ).
Similarly, for the convex function f (x, y, t) ln(1 + 1/xy) 1/t , one has the following inequality for every x > 0, y > 0, t > 0,x > 0,ȳ > 0 andt > 0, ln(1 + 1/xy) t = f (x, y, t)
≥ f (x,ȳ,t) + ∇f (x,ȳ,t), (x, y, t) − (x,ȳ,t) = 2 ln(1 + 1/xȳ) t + 1/xȳ t(1 + 1/xȳ) (2 − x/x − y/ȳ) − ln(1 + 1/xȳ) t 2 t (75)
Analogously, the inequality
follows from the convexity of function α − ln(1 + x) t over the trust region 0 ≤ x ≤ M.
Lastly, the inequality ln(1 + x/y) ≤ ln(1 +x/ȳ) + 1 1 +x/ȳ (0.5(x 2 /x +x)/y −x/ȳ)
follows from the concavity of function ln(1 + z) and then the inequality x = 0.5(x 2 /x +x) − 0.5(x −x) 2 /x ≤ 0.5(x 2 /x +x) ∀x > 0,x > 0.
